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PUBLIC

THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL

CT-2022-002

IN THE MATTER OF the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34; AND IN THE MATTER OF the proposed acquisition by Rogers Communications Inc. of Shaw Communications Inc.;

AND IN THE MATTER OF an application by the Commissioner of Competition for one or more orders pursuant to section 92 of the Competition Act.

B E T W E E N:

COMMISSIONER OF COMPETITION - and

Applicant

ROGERS COMMUNICATION INC. AND SHAW COMMUNICATIONS INC. Respondents - and -

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA and VIDEOTRON LTD. Interveners

RESPONDING MEMORANDUM OF FACT AND LAW OF ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC. (Bell and Telus’ Motions to Quash Subpoenas)

October 26, 2022

LAX O’SULLIVAN LISUS GOTTLIEB LLP 145 King Street West, Suite 2750 Toronto, ON M5H 1J8

Jonathan C. Lisus (LSO# 32952H) Tel: 416.598.7873 Email: jlisus@lolg.ca Crawford G. Smith (LSO# 42131S) Tel: 416.598.8648 Email: csmith@lolg.ca Matthew R. Law (LSO# 59856A) Tel: 416.849.9050 Email: mlaw@lolg.ca Bradley Vermeersch (LSO# 69004K) Tel: 416.646.7997

TO:

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Email: bvermeersch@lolg.ca Zain Naqi (LSO#: 67870U) Tel: 416.645.3789 Email: znaqi@lolg.ca

Counsel for the Respondent/Responding Party, Rogers Communications Inc.

THE COMMISSIONER OF COMPETITION Department of Justice Canada Competition Bureau Legal Services Place du Portage, Phase I 50 Victoria Street, 22nd Floor Gatineau, QC K1A 0C9

John S. Tyhurst Derek Leschinsky Katherine Rydel Ryan Caron Suzanie Chua Marie-Hélène Gay Kevin Hong Tel: (819) 956-2842 / (613) 897-7682 Fax: (819) 953-9267

Counsel for the Applicant/Responding Party, The Commissioner of Competition

AND TO:

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DAVIES WARD PHILLIPS & VINEBERG LLP 155 Wellington Street West Toronto, ON M5V 3J7

Kent E. Thomson (LSO# 24264J) Tel: 416.863.5566 Email: kentthomson@dwpv.com Derek D. Ricci (LSO# 52366N) Tel: 416.367.7471 Email: dricci@dwpv.com Steven Frankel (LSO# 58892E) Tel: 416.367.7441 Email: sfrankel@dwpv.com Chanakya A. Sethi (LSO# 63492T) Tel: 416.863.5516 Email: csethi@dwpv.com

Counsel for the Respondent/Moving Party, Shaw Communications Inc.

AND TO:

GOVERNMENT OF ALBERTA Justice and Solicitor General Government of Alberta 4th Floor, Bowker Building 9833-109 Street Edmonton, AB T5K 2E8

Kyle Dickson-Smith Tel: 780.644.4880 Email: kyle.dickson-smith@gov.ab.ca Opeyemi Bello Tel: 587.985.0564 Email: opeyemi.bello@gov.ab.ca

Counsel for the Intervenor, Attorney General of Alberta

AND TO:

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BENNETT JONES LLP 3400 One First Canadian Place Toronto, On M5X 1A4

John F. Rook Q.C. (LSO# 13786N) Tel: 416.777.4885 Email: rookj@bennettjones.com Emrys Davis (LSO# 57391B) Tel: 416.777.6242 Email: davise@bennettjones.com Alysha Pannu (LSO# 74369O) Tel: 416.777.5514 Email: pannuaa@bennettjones.com

Counsel for the Intervenor, Videotron Ltd.

AND TO:

BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON LLP 199 Bay Street Suite 4000, Commerce Court West Toronto, ON M5L 1A9

Randall Hofley (LSO# 31633L) Email: randall.hofley@blakes.com Nicole Henderson (LSO# 56799K) Email: nicole.henderson@blakes.com Joseph McGrade (LSO# 73277P) Email: joe.mcgrade@blakes.com

Tel: 416 863 2400 Counsel for BCE Inc.

AND TO:

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OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT 100 King Street West 1 First Canadian Place Suite 6200, P.O. Box 50 Toronto, ON M5X 1B8

Chris Naudie (LSO# 39596P) Email: cnaudie@osler.com Michelle Lally (LSO# 33337B) Email: mlally@osler.com Adam Hirsh (LSO# 55239Q) Email: ahirsh@osler.com Kaeleigh Kuzma (LSO# 55271B) Email: kkuzma@osler.com

Tel: 416 362 2111 Counsel for Telus Communications Inc.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

PART I - OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................. 1 PART II - SUMMARY OF FACTS ............................................................................................. 3 A. Bell and Telus Are Not Disinterested Observers .................................................. 3 B. The Commissioner’s Case on Videotron’s Ability to Compete ......................... 4 C. Bell/Telus Provide Witness Statements in Support of Commissioner’s Case ............................................................................................................................................. 6

i.

Bell’s Statements on Videotron’s Ability to Compete and Need for Wireline ................................................................................................................................. 6

ii. Telus’ Statements on Need for Wireline to Compete Effectively .................. 8 iii. Bell’s Statement Addresses Network Disruptions and Outages ................... 9 D. The Subpoenas Seek A Targeted Set of Documents ........................................... 9 E. Telus Has Identified a Handful of Responsive Documents .............................. 10 F. Bell Has Identified A Handful of Responsive Documents ................................ 13 PART III - STATEMENT OF ISSUES, LAW & AUTHORITIES ......................................... 14 A. The Subpoenas Seek Relevant and Probative Documents .............................. 15 B. No “End-Run” Around the Tribunal Rules and Processes ............................... 18 C. Requests Are Targeted and Scope of Responsive Documents Narrow ....... 21 D. The Commissioner’s Role on These Motions ...................................................... 23 E. Concerns about Commercial Sensitivity Are Not an Impediment .................. 24 F. The Tribunal May Direct When the Documents Are To Be Produced ............ 25 PART IV - ORDER REQUESTED ........................................................................................... 26

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PART I - OVERVIEW 1. Bell and Telus are two of the largest market participants in the wireless industry. They are and have been involved in the Commissioner’s review, investigation, and prosecution of this proceeding. They have engaged voluntarily. They have an extensive history of opposition to the proposed transaction. They made detailed written submissions with their counsel to the Commissioner which have, in large measure, shaped the Commissioner’s pleadings, expert evidence, and witness statements.

2. On September 23, 2022, the Commissioner served his affirmative evidence. Bell and Telus are central to his case. The Commissioner served four witness statements (two each) from Bell and Telus.

3. Bell and Telus have chosen to support the Commissioner on a key issue in this case: whether Videotron can effectively compete in markets where it does not own a wireline network. This assertion is ironic because Bell and Telus both have successful wireless businesses where they do not own wireline networks. Similarly, Rogers has no wireline network in the west and yet is a market leader in wireless. And 73% of Freedom Mobile’s subscribers are in Ontario where it has no wireline network. Bell’s witness statement also addresses network architecture and the July outages.

4. Rogers has issued focused subpoenas seeking Bell and Telus’ Board and ELT documents which address their real view of the effectiveness of Videotron as a wireless competitor and its need for a wireline network to effectively compete. In the case of Bell, Rogers also seeks documents concerning Rogers’ July network outage—which the

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Commissioner has made an issue, and the Tribunal has determined, relevant. None of the documents identified in the subpoenas were part of the Commissioner’s Affidavit of Documents. They could not have been asked for or pursued by Rogers. And it was months later that Bell and Telus chose to provide witness statements. There is no abuse of process here or “end-run” around the discovery process.

5. The evidence on cross-examination establishes that Telus has identified a discrete, organized collection of material that it concedes is responsive to the subpoena. This material consists of one board presentation of about 30 pages and several memoranda to ELT members consisting of about 100-110 pages. In total, Telus has identified no more than 140 pages of documents that are responsive to the subpoenas, probative of the issues, and readily available. No privilege is asserted. Bell has identified, to date, a handful of documents comprising about 30-40 pages of material.

6. Bell and Telus’ contemporaneous memoranda and presentations are the best evidence of their true assessment of the competitive threat posed by Videotron. They will show the significance, if any, Bell and Telus genuinely place on wireline assets as a competitive advantage for Freedom.

7. The Commissioner’s role on this motion deserves mention. This Tribunal has emphasized his role as an officer acting in the public interest and he is duty-bound to ensure the best available evidence is before the Tribunal. He has liaised with Bell and Telus at every stage of this proceeding, and his opposition now to the delivery of a focused set of documents highly probative of the matters in issue, and which he has not seen, is surprising.

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PART II - SUMMARY OF FACTS A. Bell and Telus Are Not Disinterested Observers 8. Bell and Telus’ opposition to this transaction is well-documented. Since Rogers and Shaw announced their agreement on March 13, 2021, Bell and Telus have pursued multiple avenues with regulators to advocate a complete block of the transaction. That opposition has been unchanged since the divestiture announcement on June 17, 2022.

9.

The statements of Bell and Telus to regulators reveal a determined effort

(a)

1

:

CTRC: In November and December 2021, the CRTC held hearings to review the transaction as it relates to the sale of Shaw’s broadcasting distribution business. Bell advocated that “[g]ranting approval to Rogers to acquire Shaw will have a transformative impact on the Canadian broadcasting system, one that would be highly detrimental overall.” 2 It urged the CRTC to “conclude that approval is not in the public interest and deny the Application outright” and that “denial must be the only outcome.” 3

Telus claimed the transaction would “decrease competition, plurality of ownership, and the diversity of voices in the broadcasting system.” It said a denial was “the only course of action that is proportionate to the concerns raised.” 4

(b)

ISED: The Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development is charged with reviewing spectrum transfers. Bell and Telus have lobbied the Minister to deny them. As early as May 2021,

1 In addition to substantive submissions, Bell and Telus attempted to take advantage of litigation around the corporate control of Rogers to postpone the hearing of the CRTC’s Notice of Consultation 2021-281 and with it, commercial certainty for Rogers and Shaw as competitors. 2 Bell Final Submissions to CRTC dated December 13, 2021, Affidavit of Ashley McKnight affirmed October 19, 2022 (“McKnight, Bell Affidavit”), Exhibit “N”, Responding Motion Record of Rogers Communications Inc. to BCE Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoenas (“RMR, Bell”), p.333. 3 Bell Intervention CRTC Hearing dated September 13, 2021, McKnight, Bell Affidavit, Exhibit “L”, RMR, Bell, pp. 316, 318. 4 Telus Submission to CRTC dated September 13, 2021, Affidavit of Ashley McKnight affirmed October 19, 2022 (“McKnight, Telus Affidavit”), Exhibit “J”, Responding Motion Record of Rogers Communications Inc. to Telus Communications Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoenas (“RMR, Telus”), p.149.

(c)

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Competition Bureau: Within weeks of the transaction being announced, Bell began a campaign to persuade the Commissioner to block it.

In addition to these submissions, Bell and Telus have had numerous meetings, consultations, and communications with the Commissioner’s staff and counsel over the past year-and-a-half. Most recently, as part of his section 92 application, the Commissioner asked, and Bell and Telus agreed, to provide witness statements in support of its case.

B. The Commissioner’s Case on Videotron’s Ability to Compete 10. The Commissioner’s case rests, in significant part, on the contention that Freedom under Videotron will struggle to compete as vigorously as it did under Shaw for a lack of wireline assets. This claim is foundational to his pleaded case and to the evidence he has led in support of his section 92 application.

5 McKnight, Bell Affidavit, Exhibit “I”, RMR, Bell, p.235. 6 Bell’s Submission to the Competition Bureau dated December 29, 2022, para. 87, McKnight, Bell Affidavit, Exhibit “J”, RMR, Bell, p. 276. 7 Ibid.

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11. The Commissioner alleges that “[s]evering Freedom Mobile from Shaw’s wireline business will substantially compromise its ability to compete and provide much-needed competitive discipline to the National Carriers.” As he pleads in his amended reply:

While Rogers pleads that the Proposed Transaction and the Divestiture would increase competition, as noted above, that is not the case, given factors which include Rogers’ different market position and incentives from Shaw and the difficulties and reduced competitiveness which Videotron will face without wireline assets and other benefits derived by Shaw from its wireline business. These factors make it likely that there will be increased post-merger coordination and reduced competition in Wireless Services. 8

12. On September 23, 2022, the parties exchanged witness statements and expert reports in-chief. The Commissioner’s economics and industry experts, Dr. Nathan Miller and Dr. Michael Davies, opine that Freedom will have less incentive and ability to compete without Shaw’s wireline assets. Bell and Telus’ witness statements directly engage and support this issue.

13. The respondents and Videotron dispute the Commissioner’s contention that wireline assets are essential to success in wireless. They have filed extensive fact and expert evidence in response to the Commissioner’s position. Videotron’s witness statements make clear that, in its considered business judgment, it has negotiated and secured all the assets it needs to compete effectively. The respondents’ experts have opined that wireline ownership is not necessary to the growth and competitive strength of a wireless business, citing a large body of technological and industry evidence.

8 Fresh as Amended Reply to Rogers, dated September 2, 2022, para. 17, McKnight, Bell Affidavit, Exhibit “C”, RMR, Bell, pp. 78-79, Rogers’ Compendium for Oral Argument (“Compendium”), tab 2, pp. 14-15.

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C. Bell/Telus Provide Witness Statements in Support of Commissioner’s Case 14. As part of his affirmative case delivered on September 23, the Commissioner led evidence from Bell and Telus:

(a)

(b)

Bell provided two witness statements, one from Blaik Kirby, its Group President, Consumer and Small & Medium Business and the other from Stephen Howe, its Chief Technology and Information Officer 9 ;

Telus provided two witness statements, one from Charlie Casey, its Vice President, Consumer and Controller and the other from Nazim Benhadid, its Senior Vice President, Network Build & Operate.

15. These statements were voluntary; they were not compelled by summonses. The Bell and Telus statements go to a fundamental issue in dispute: the divestiture of Freedom and its ability to compete under Videotron’s ownership.

i. Bell’s Statements on Videotron’s Ability to Compete and Need for Wireline 16. Mr. Kirby is the president of Bell’s wireless and wireline units. He leads the sales, marketing, and product development teams responsible for these businesses. In his statement, he espouses the Commissioner’s position on the need for wireline assets to succeed in wireless:

Without our wireline infrastructure and operations, Bell would not be as effective a wireless competitor as we are today. My experience in the Canadian telecommunications industry indicates that is true for all integrated wireless competitors in Canada, including Shaw/Freedom Mobile. For example, I have observed that Videotron’s position as an integrated wireless and wireline competitor in Quebec, leveraging tactics such as cross-selling wireless services and offering

9 The Commissioner also delivered a witness statement from Christopher Hickey, the Director, Regulatory Affairs at Distributel Communications Ltd, which is now owned by Bell.

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large multiproduct discounts, has been essential to its ability to succeed as a disruptive competitor in that province. 10

17. Mr. Kirby states that “a significant contributing factor to [Videotron’s] wireless results in the province of Quebec has been their ability to cross-sell wireless services to their large existing Internet subscriber base and to offer large multiproduct discounts.” 11 He claims that, if it is allowed to acquire Freedom, Videotron will not be able to compete as effectively as Shaw:

I do not expect that, if Videotron expands into other provinces, it could or would play the same large and disruptive role as it has done in Quebec, given that it will be very differently positioned. Rather, it is the combination of Shaw and Shaw Mobile that I would expect to play a more disruptive role in the market in Alberta and British Columbia. 12

18. Likewise, Mr. Howe, Bell’s Chief Technology and Information Officer, speaks to the “benefits for wireless network deployment associated with owning an extensive wireline access network in the same footprint”:

While our experience demonstrates that it is possible for an established national wireless operator to successfully deploy a wireless network outside an existing wireline network footprint, deploying in an area where we have such a footprint provides us with significant opportunities to reduce costs, reduce deployment timelines, and increase innovation. The same would be true for other companies,

10 Witness Statement of Blaik Kirby dated September 23, 2022 (“Kirby Statement”), para. 25, McKnight, Bell Affidavit, Exhibit “G”, Bell RMR, pp. 117-118, Compendium, tab 4, pp. 22-23. 11 Kirby Statement, para. 43, McKnight, Bell Affidavit, Exhibit “G”, RMR, p. 123, Compendium, tab 4, pp. 24-25. 12 Kirby Statement, para. 47, McKnight, Bell Affidavit, Exhibit “G”, RMR, p. 125, Compendium, tab 4, p.26.

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including Shaw (Shaw Mobile and Freedom), deploying a wireless network within their traditional wireline footprint. 13

ii. Telus’ Statements on Need for Wireline to Compete Effectively 19. Mr. Benhadid is a senior executive responsible for Telus’ wireless and wireline network build and maintenance. His evidence is also directed at the Commissioner’s position that wireline ownership is essential to competitiveness in wireless.

20. In his statement, Mr. Benhadid testifies that Telus “constantly competes for customers with Rogers, Bell, Shaw and others on the basis of network reliability and capability” and that “wireline network ownership is critical to wireless network performance and reliability.” 14 He states that the “quality, performance, and reliability of our wireless network is heavily dependent upon the quality, performance, and reliability of our wireline network” and stresses the benefits of “[o]wning [wireline] facilities (as opposed to leasing them).” 15

21. Both the Bell and Telus witnesses directly engage the competitive dynamics of the wireless business and the assets that a wireless carrier requires to effectively compete. Their evidence is in service of the Commissioner’s core narrative.

13 Witness Statement of Stephen Howe dated September 23, 2022, (“Howe Statement”), para. 10, McKnight, Bell Affidavit, Exhibit “H”, RMR, Bell, p. 137, Compendium, tab 5, pp. 28-29. 14 Witness Statement of Nazim Benhadid dated September 20, 2022, (“Benhadid Statement”), paras 4,9, McKnight, Telus Affidavit, Exhibit “I”, RMR, Telus, pp. 123, 126, Compendium, tab 7, pp. 39, 42. 15 Benhadid Statement, paras. 4-5, McKnight, Telus Affidavit, Exhibit “I”, RMR, Telus, pp.123-124, Compendium, tab 7, pp. 39-40.

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iii. Bell’s Statement Addresses Network Disruptions and Outages 22. On August 26, 2022, Chief Justice Paul Crampton heard a discovery-related motion and determined that “questions relating to network outages are relevant.” The statement of Mr. Howe weighs in directly on this issue. Mr. Howe testifies that:

In my experience, network resiliency is a critical element of network quality and a reduction in the resiliency of the networks serving customerseven if it is not experienced day to day but instead only when there is a problemis a reduction in the quality of the services made available to them. The importance of network resiliency in competition between carriers, and the focus carriers place on it, is reflected in the fact that for many years carriers in Canada have competed to offer Canadian consumers and businesses the “most reliable” network. 16

D. The Subpoenas Seek A Targeted Set of Documents 23. On October 4, 2021, Rogers served the Bell and Telus witnesses with subpoenas for relevant documents. They invited discussions with counsel for Bell and Telus to narrow and clarify the scope of these requests. Bell and Telus refused. 17

24.

On October 13, 2022, Bell and Telus served these motions to quash.

25. Fresh subpoenas were served the next day to address Bell and Telus’ objections about scope—which could have been addressed earlier had they accepted the invitation to discuss. The fresh subpoenas are focussed and targeted.

16 Howe Statement, para. 15, McKnight, Bell Affidavit, Exhibit “H”, RMR, Bell, p.139, Compendium, tab 5, p. 30. 17 Letter from D. Ricci to counsel for Bell and Telus dated October 14 2022, Supplementary Affidavit of Daniel Stern dated October 17, 2022 (“Stern Supplementary Affidavit”), Exhibit “C”, pp. 20-21.

26.

27.

28.

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Rogers’ subpoena to the Telus witnesses seeks production of:

(a)

All memoranda or presentations dated on or after May 7, 2022, to Telus’ board of directors or executive leadership team considering the proposed divestiture of Freedom to Videotron. 18

Rogers’ subpoena to the Bell witnesses seeks production of:

(a)

(b)

All memoranda or presentations dated on or after May 7, 2022, to Bell’s board of directors or executive leadership team considering the proposed divestiture of Freedom to Videotron; and

All memoranda or presentations to Bell’s board of directors or executive leadership team on or after July 8, 2022, containing analysis of Rogers’ network outage that occurred on July 8, 2022. 19

The documents sought are not in the Commissioner’s Affidavit of Documents.

E. Telus Has Identified a Handful of Responsive Documents 29. In support of its motion, Telus filed affidavits from Daniel Stern, its Director, Regulatory Law and Policy. On cross-examination, Mr. Stern testified about the steps he took to gather responsive documents.

30. With respect to memoranda and presentations to the Board about the Videotron divestiture, he spoke with Andrea Wood, Telus’ Chief Legal and Governance Officer. Ms. Wood is the Secretary of the Board responsible for attending and taking minutes of all Board meetings. Mr. Stern testified that he gave Ms. Wood a copy of the subpoena and asked her for responsive documents.

18 Rogers’ subpoena to Telus Witnesses dated October 14, 2022, McKnight, Telus Affidavit, Exhibit “M”, RMR, Telus, pp.183-185, Compendium, pp. 7-9. 19 Rogers’ Subpoena to Bell Witnesses dated October 14, 2022, McKnight, Bell Affidavit, Exhibit “P”, RMR, Bell, pp.354-356, Compendium, pp. 10-12.

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31. Ms. Wood readily identified only two—a board package of approximately 30 pages and an email from Telus’ CEO, Mr. Darren Entwistle, to the Board:

Q. Well, Mr. Stern, I take it, sir, when you went to speak to Ms. Wood you gave her a copy of the summons, correct?

A. Yes. That's exactly what's making me think of this. I gave her the summons and she gave me documents in response. I can't remember exactly what they say, but, right, that's a good point. Summons asked for divestiture. I can't remember exactly what they say. I'm not trying to be difficult.

Q. Let's just establish the proposition. Ms. Wood is a lawyer and a Board secretary, correct?

A. Correct. Q. You gave her the summons, correct? A. Correct. Q. You asked her, are there documents responsive to the summons, correct?

A. Correct. Q. She gave you a package of documents as responsive to the summons, correct?

A. Correct. Q. That is a 30 page document? A. Approximately, I don't know exactly. Q. Is that the only document that she gave you as responsive to the summons as it relates to the Board of Directors?

A. I want to clarify the word "responsive". I asked for her for anything that potentially could be responsive that we ran by our external counsel. So I guess my answer is I need to speak to external counsel as to their views of whether or not it was responsive. But it was not the only document she provided me in response to that request.

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Q. Okay. Other than the 30 page document, what else -- other than the 30 page document, which just discuss the proposed transaction, what else did she give?

A. An email. Q. And it is an email from whom to whom? A. From our CEO to the Board. Q. Other than an email and a 30 page presentation, did Ms. Wood give you any other documents responsive to the summons?

A. No. Q. Let's just be perfectly clear about that. Is that response in relation to the materials provided to the Board of Directors alone or to the Board of Directors and the ELT?

A. To the Board of Directors alone.

20

32. With respect to memoranda or presentations on the Videotron divestiture that went to members of Telus’ Executive Leadership Team (“ELT”), Mr. Stern testified that he made inquiries of their deputies. He was given “a few” documents, “maybe three, four, five documents, something in that range” sent to James Senko, Telus’ Executive Vice-President and President, Mobility Solutions. This totalled approximately 40-50 pages of material. 21 In relation to other members of the ELT, he received another six or seven slide decks—about sixty or so pages in total—which he said may be

20 Transcript of Cross-examination of Daniel Stern dated October 10, 2022 (“Stern Cross”), pp. 43-48, Compendium, tab 11, pp. 146-151. 21 Stern Cross, pp. 56-57, Compendium, tab 11, pp.159-160.

responsive. ELT.

22

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These documents were all shared with some, if not all, members of the

33. The universe of documents is narrow. The key documents, including the Board package, have been confirmed by Telus’ Chief Legal Officer as responsive to the summons, are available to be produced, and no privilege is asserted.

F. Bell Has Identified A Handful of Responsive Documents 34. In support of its motion, Bell filed affidavits from Mark Graham, its Vice-President, Legal and Regulatory. Like his counterpart at Telus, Mr. Graham identified a handful of responsive documents to the Rogers subpoena.

35. On cross-examination, Mr. Graham testified that after receiving Rogers’ original subpoena (dated October 4), but prior to receiving the fresh subpoena on October 14, he made inquiries of Bell’s Assistant Corporate Secretary about whether the Rogers/Shaw transaction or Rogers’ July 2022 network outage were discussed at any Board meetings.

36. In response, he was provided with approximately 10 pages of material related to the outage and 8-15 pages of material about the Rogers’ transaction, including the acquisition of Freedom by Videotron. 23

37. After the fresh subpoena was served, Mr. Graham admitted he took no further steps to identify or collect any responsive documents on either the divestiture or the

22 Stern Cross, pp. 58-59, Compendium, tab 11, pp.161-162. 23 Transcript of Cross-examination of Mark Graham dated October 24, 2022 (“Graham Cross”), qq. 70- 104, Compendium, tab 10, pp. 67-73.

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outage. 24 Although he sent the subpoenas to Mr. Kirby and Mr. Howe, he did not ask them for responsive documents—either before or after the requests were narrowed. Despite Mr. Kirby’s position as a member of ELT and head of Bell’s consumer wireless business, Mr. Graham did not ask him whether he had given, received, or prepared any memoranda or presentations on the proposed sale of Freedom to Videotron. Nor did he do so with respect to Mr. Howe, who also sits on the ELT. 25

38. Based on his earlier review of ELT meeting agenda items, Mr. Graham identified only one ELT item pertaining to the transaction—which was 5-6 pages long. In total, the volume of documents gathered by Mr. Graham is approximately 30-40 pages and is available to be produced. 26

PART III - STATEMENT OF ISSUES, LAW & AUTHORITIES 39. There are two issues on this motion:

(a)

(b)

Do the Rogers subpoenas call for relevant documents that are significant and probative to matters in dispute? Yes.

If so, have Bell and Telus established any legal basis to properly withhold production and quash the subpoenas? No.

40. There can be no dispute that the documents sought are probative of the Bell and Telus’ witness evidence, and therefore the issues in this proceeding, and are responsive to the subpoenas. They engage the Commissioner’s core objections to

24 Graham Cross, qq. 115-138, Compendium, tab 10, pp.75-81. 25 Graham Cross, qq.159-185, Compendium, tab 10, pp.85-90. 26 Graham Cross, qq. 197-233, Compendium, tab 10, pp. 93-100.

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Videotron’s acquisition of Freedom, on which Bell and Telus have willingly interposed themselves. Having done so, they should not be permitted to resist production.

A. The Subpoenas Seek Relevant and Probative Documents 41. The law governing subpoenas is well-established. The Federal Court has held that a subpoena should not be quashed if the evidence sought is “relevant and significant in regard to the issues the Court must decide,” unless a privilege or other legal rule applies prohibiting production. 27

42. Relevance is determined by the pleadings. The competitive impact of Videotron’s proposed acquisition of Freedom is bedrock to this proceeding. The Commissioner’s pleadings are replete with claims that Freedom will not be able to compete as effectively under Videotron. Among other things, the Commissioner alleges Freedom will experience “difficulties” and suffer from “reduced competitiveness” because of:

(a) (b) (c)

(d)

the impacts of the separation of Freedom from Shaw; Videotron’s reduced access to wireline assets; the different competitive circumstances of Videotron, which affect the likelihood or ability to replicate or to approximate Shaw’s competitive vigour, tactics and incentives; and

the loss to Videotron of the benefits of Freedom’s integration with Shaw.

28

43. The Bell and Telus witness statements relate directly to these pleaded allegations. Specifically, the Commissioner relies on Bell and Telus to support its claims

27 See Laboratoires Servier v. Apotex Inc., 2008 FC 321 at para. 19. 28 Commissioner’s Response to Demand for Particulars dated September 12, 2022, para. 1, McKnight, Bell Affidavit, Exhibit “E”, RMR, Bell, pp.89-90, Compendium, tab 3, pp. 89-90.

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of wireline/wireless interdependency and the necessity of wireline assets for wireless competition:

(a)

(b)

Mr. Kirby makes this link explicitly in his evidence. He attributes the success of Videotron’s wireless business in Quebec to its wireline infrastructure and expresses doubt that it “could or would play the same large and disruptive role as it has done in Quebec” when expanding into other provinces. He concludes that Freedom under Videotron will be a less disruptive and competitive force than Shaw; and

Mr. Benhadid emphasizes the importance of wireline to the performance and reliability of a wireless network and that carriers actively compete along these metrics. The clear import of his evidence is that a wireless carrier without wireline will not have the same ability to compete on network performance and reliability.

44. Put simply, the Commissioner advances Bell and Telus’ evidence to prove a disputed fact: that Freedom will be disadvantaged by its separation from Shaw’s wireline assets and that, under Videotron, it will not be adequately equipped to remain a viable and strong competitive force.

45. In that context, Bell and Telus’ contemporaneous internal memoranda and presentations on the divestiture to Videotron are highly probative. They are the best evidence of Bell and Telus’ considered and frank assessments of the competitive threat posed by Videotron.

46. These documents will demonstrate whether Bell and Telus, leading market players in wireless, have evaluated Freedom under Videotron to be more or less likely to compete effectively. They will reveal what significance, if any, Bell and Telus place on Shaw’s wireline assets as a competitive advantage for Freedom. In other words, they will help to prove or disprove a key disputed fact that the Tribunal must decide. They will be of great assistance to the Tribunal and the process.

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47. Telus’ submissions entirely miss the point on the relevance and importance of these documents. Telus submits that the “only purported basis for relevance asserted by the respondents thus far is to allegedly test the credibility of the TELUS witnesses.” This is wrong. The documents have not been sought solely, or even primarily, to challenge “credibility”. Nor does Rogers request them to “show that” Bell and Telus were “opposed to the transaction.” The record is clear that they do unreservedly.

48. The documents are significant because the parties have joined issue on whether Freedom under Videotron is poised to be stronger or weaker competitor than it was under Shaw. Through their witness statements, Bell and Telus have inserted themselves into this debate as market participants. The Tribunal will have to consider what weight, if any, to assign to their evidence. In determining the competitive impact of a divested Freedom, the Tribunal will be called on to review the entirety of the record including expert evidence and the assessments of market participants, such as Rogers, Shaw, Videotron—but also Bell and Telus. The documents sought will no doubt facilitate the Tribunal’s fact-finding function.

49. Indeed, Bell and Telus essentially concede the relevance and probative value of these documents. On behalf of Telus, Mr. Stern deposes that “given the nature of the request, the documents sought will necessarily contain highly confidential, competitively sensitive forward-looking information regarding TELUS’ commercial plan in light of a potential divestiture of Freedom Mobile to Videotron.” 29 On cross-examination, he

29 Stern Supplementary Affidavit, para. 19, Compendium, tab 9, pp. 46-47.

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conceded that the sale of Freedom to Videotron is a “significant event in the telecommunications industry”, which would have implications for Telus’ business.

30

50. Mr. Graham’s testimony was the same: he agreed that the subpoenas ask for documents “on two of the most high-profile topics in the Canadian telecommunications industry in recent years with broad implications across Bell’s business.” 31 It is difficult to imagine how the competitive evaluations and reactions of two of the top three market players to the transaction at issue—one that they admit is a game-changer for the industry—could be irrelevant or immaterial to the Tribunal’s work.

51. The Commissioner plainly considers the evidence of Bell and Telus important for the Tribunal, which is why he served their statements. The Tribunal should have their complete evidence, not only the evidence they deem appropriate.

B. No “End-Run” Around the Tribunal Rules and Processes 52. Bell and Telus submit that the Rogers subpoenas attempt to circumvent the Tribunal rules and processes. Their argument appears to be that the responsive documents should have been sought or obtained at an earlier stage of this proceeding, through the discovery and pre-hearing disclosure mechanisms established by the Tribunal.

30 Stern Cross, p. 10, Compendium, tab 9, p.113. 31 Affidavit of Mark Graham affirmed October 18, 2022, para. 7, Compendium, tab 8, p. 44.

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53. But this argument overlooks a critical fact: the documents sought have never been in the power, possession or control of the Commissioner, nor are they now. It is undisputed that:

(a)

(b)

(c)

none of the documents at issue are listed Commissioner’s Schedule “A” or Schedule “B”.

none were ordered to be produced in the Commissioner’s s. 11 orders issued against Bell and Telus; and

none were subsequently provided to the Commissioner as part of continuing exchanges of documents with Bell and Telus.

54. The suggestion of an “end-run” around the Tribunal’s process is without merit. Rogers is not seeking documents from Bell and Telus that it could have obtained from the Commissioner. Nor is it seeking documents that the Rules otherwise provide for through an alternative mechanism.

55. Bell and Telus’ reliance on Canada Pipe is misplaced. That case involved an attempt to use a subpoena duces tecum to compel third-party documents which the Commissioner had possession and control of, refused to produce, and had no obligation to produce. The case was decided under the old Tribunal Rules, where the Commissioner’s procedural fairness and disclosure obligations were limited to the production of reliance documents (as opposed to all relevant documents). It should be approached with caution. The holding in Canada Pipe, to the extent it could be said to apply at all under the new Rules, extends only to documents that are being sought from a third party where the Commissioner already has those documents in his possession and control. That principle does not apply to the documents Rogers seeks.

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56. There is no “abuse of process” under Canada Pipe or otherwise. The abuse of process doctrine “engages the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party to the litigation before it or would in some other way bring the administration of justice into disrepute.” 32 There is no unfairness to Bell and Telus in having to produce a focused set of documents that arise directly out of their voluntary participation at trial.

57. Nor is this request a form of impermissible “third-party discovery”. Rogers is not asking to “discover” Bell and Telus at large. It requests discrete documents, largely identified and already collected, admitted to be responsive to the subpoenas, which bear on the proof of a key disputed fact and which Bell and Telus’ own witnesses have weighed in on. To call this impermissible “third party” discovery is tantamount to a suggestion that a subpoena issued under section 7 of the Tribunal Rules could never be used to seek documents from a witness appearing before the Tribunal. There is no authority for that proposition.

58. The assertion that the documents should have been sought earlier and by some other mechanism also fails to acknowledge the substantial amplification of Bell and Telus’ evidence with the delivery of their witness statements. The subpoenaed documents became a live issue when Bell and Telus chose to become part of the Commissioner’s case in chief in support of the Commissioner’s position (advocated for by them) on the issue of Videotron’s competitiveness and the need for wireline assets to compete. The same is true of the July 8 outage.

32 Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, at para. 37.

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59. Finally, Telus submits that its witnesses will not be able to speak to the documents sought. That is an odd suggestion, unsupported by any evidence on this motion from Mr. Benhadid or Mr. Casey and contradicted by their witness statements. Both are senior executives at Telus who have been with the company for over two decades. Their witness statements directly engage on competition in the wireless marketplace. If they were unable to speak to competitive dynamics, they would not already have done so.

60. To its credit, Bell does not attempt to disclaim its witnesses in the same way Telus does.

61. The significance of these documents must be assessed in light of the process as a whole. They will be beneficial to the Tribunal not only for what the Bell and Telus witnesses say about them, but for the evidentiary record in its totality. The unvarnished competitive evaluations and reactions of two primary market participants are crucial data points that will inform the experts and ultimately, the Tribunal’s assessment of Videotron’s positioning in the marketplace and the likely impact of the divestiture. That can only be helpful to the parties, the Tribunal, and the trial process.

C. Requests Are Targeted and Scope of Responsive Documents Narrow 62. Bell and Telus make bald claims that Rogers is engaged in a “fishing expedition” and the requests are burdensome. The evidence of Bell and Telus’ representatives on cross-examination belies these assertions.

63. The subpoenas are cast narrowly. They seek memoranda and presentations to the Board and ELT on the Freedom divestiture (and in the case of Bell, on the outage).

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Rogers does not seek a forensic review of correspondence, communications, and other voluminous materials. It has made that abundantly clear in its request.

64. Compliance with the subpoenas is straightforward and can be accomplished. It is neither burdensome nor “oppressive”. The categories are well-defined. They call for inquiries of (1) Board secretaries who keep custody of Board packages to determine if any responsive materials were provided to the members of the Board; and (2) the members of the ELT for each company (or any individuals who keep agendas and materials for the ELT) to see whether any responsive memoranda or presentations were generated or circulated.

65. This is precisely what Telus has done. On cross-examination, Mr. Stern advised that he had made inquiries of Telus’ Board Secretary and ELT members. Those inquires have yielded no more than a dozen documents, comprising about 140 pages of material. All of this is ready to produce.

66. Similarly, Bell has also identified and collected no more than 30-40 pages of material. Although it has not conducted the same exercise as Telus since the fresh subpoena was issued, it could make the inquiries without difficulty and produce the documents in short order.

67. In its factum, Bell repeats the unsubstantiated claim in Mr. Graham’s affidavit that the production of responsive documents would take between 60-90 days. It ignores Mr. Graham’s evidence on cross-examination. It is not clear where this 60-90-day estimate comes from. Mr. Graham admitted that he had not even made inquiries to identify or collect documents in response to the fresh subpoena, which is the one at issue. The

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estimate Bell relies on is untethered from the current requests and was related to the earlier subpoenas that have been withdrawn. The 60–90-day timeframe is also contradicted by Telus’ evidence that it has already identified and collected responsive documents.

D. The Commissioner’s Role on These Motions 68. The Commissioner’s posture on these motions is surprising given his status as a “guardian of the public interest.” 33 As Justice Blanchard held in Canada Pipe, “the Commissioner is not a normal adversary”— rather, he is “a public officer with a statutory obligation to act fairly.” Indeed, “just as the Crown prosecutor must be motivated by fairness and not the notion of winning or losing, so too the Commissioner must be motivated by goals of fundamental fairness and not by achieving strategic advantage in the proceeding.” 34

69. The Commissioner’s support for Bell and Telus’ motions to quash cannot, respectfully, be squared with these duties. Bell and Telus have been actively involved from the very beginning in the Commissioner’s investigation and presentation of his case. The Commissioner has elected to put forward witness statements from them for the purpose of facilitating the Tribunal’s determination of key issues in dispute.

70. The Commissioner has led that evidence not to “win” the case, but to assist this process. The Commissioner should welcome the opportunity to have additional

33 Commissioner of Competition v. Vancouver Airport Authority, 2017 Comp Trib 6, at para. 68, rev’d on other grounds in Vancouver Airport Authority v. Commissioner of Competition, 2018 FCA 24. 34 Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Canada Pipe Co., 2004 Comp. Trib. 2, at paras. 62-64.

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probative evidence put before the Tribunal on key issues, including the best available evidence of market evaluations and reactions to the divestiture. There is no longer any dispute that this evidence is readily available. The Commissioner’s continued opposition to the production of responsive documents is disappointing.

E. Concerns about Commercial Sensitivity Are Not an Impediment 71. Relevant and material documents properly requested pursuant to a subpoena may be withheld only if there is a legal privilege attaching to the document. A privilege must be made out in the evidence. 35 Bell and Telus have led no evidence that any of the documents identified or collected to date in response to Rogers’ subpoenas are privileged. Nor did Mr. Stern or Mr. Graham say otherwise on cross-examination. And in any event, Rogers does not seek any privileged documents.

72. Beyond the question of privilege, there is no free-standing basis to resist production of a document on the grounds of “commercial sensitivity”. There is no authority for the proposition that Bell and Telus should be able to shield otherwise probative documents from the Tribunal’s view because they are concerned that the documents contain strategic information.

73. Section 92 proceedings always involve these types of documents. Bell and Telus produced hundreds of thousands of documents pursuant to a s. 11 order, many of which reflected internal strategy or commercially sensitive information. They have

35 Canada (Office of the Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2019 FCA 95, at para. 50.

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voluntarily attached some of these documents to their witness statements. There is nothing different or special about the documents at issue.

74. The Tribunal process provides robust mechanisms for protection of documents. To the extent Bell and Telus have concerns, they can be addressed through a confidentiality order. As the Tribunal well knows, an existing confidentiality order is already in place to protect commercially sensitive information of the parties or third parties from being to disclosed to other parties or to the public. That order allows documents to be designated at the highest level of confidentiality (Level A), which would permit disclosure strictly on a counsel and experts’ eyes-only basis.

75. The Tribunal is amply equipped to deal with any legitimate concerns about confidentiality. Subject to its direction, necessary protections can be extended to any responsive documents. It is notable that the overwhelming majority of documents received by the Commissioner from Bell and Telus pursuant to s. 11 orders are designated as Level A and have been produced to the respondents with no adverse consequences.

F. The Tribunal May Direct When the Documents Are To Be Produced 76. Bell and Telus both object to the timing for production. They say that section 7 requires the witness to bring the documents on the date of his or her attendance and no advance disclosure is permitted.

77. The Tribunal, by virtue of s 8(2) of the Competition Tribunal Act, has plenary powers to control its own process on all matters “necessary or proper for the due exercise of its jurisdiction.” In that regard, it has “such powers, rights and privileges as

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are vested in a superior court of record.” This includes managing the attendance and examination of witnesses and the production and inspection of documents.

78. Section 7 of the Rules does not purport to, nor could it, derogate from these plenary powers. If the Tribunal determines that it would be proper to have the documents produced in advance of or at the start of trial, it is not precluded from doing so. Here, earlier disclosure will facilitate an orderly trial process.

PART IV - ORDER REQUESTED 79. Rogers respectfully requests an order dismissing the motions to quash its subpoenas to Bell and Telus dated October 14, 2022.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26 th

day of October 2022.

Crawford Smith

October 26, 2022

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SCHEDULE “A” LIST OF AUTHORITIES 1. Laboratoires Servier v. Apotex Inc., 2008 FC 321

2. Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63

3. Commissioner of Competition v. Vancouver Airport Authority, 2017 Comp Trib 6

4. Vancouver Airport Authority v. Commissioner of Competition, 2018 FCA 24

5. Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Canada Pipe Co., 2004 Comp. Trib. 2

6. Canada (Office of the Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2019 FCA 95

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SCHEDULE “B” TEXT OF STATUTES, REGULATIONS & BY-LAWS

Competition Tribunal Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.)) Jurisdiction and Powers of the Tribunal Jurisdiction 8 (1) The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and dispose of all applications made under Part VII.1 or VIII of the Competition Act and any related matters, as well as any matter under Part IX of that Act that is the subject of a reference under subsection 124.2(2) of that Act.

Powers (2) The Tribunal has, with respect to the attendance, swearing and examination of witnesses, the production and inspection of documents, the enforcement of its orders and other matters necessary or proper for the due exercise of its jurisdiction, all such powers, rights and privileges as are vested in a superior court of record.

Competition Tribunal Rules (SOR/2008-141)

Subpoena 7 (1) The Registrar or the person designated by the Registrar may issue a writ of subpoena for the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents.

 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.